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Within the political, scientific and economic debate on climate change, the process of 
evaluating climate policies ex-ante, during and/or ex-post their lifetime, is receiving 
increasing attention from international institutions and organisations. The task becomes 
particularly challenging when the aim is to evaluate strategies or policies from a sustainability 
perspective. The three pillars of sustainability should then be jointly considered in the 
evaluation process, thus enabling a comparison of the social, the environmental and the 
economic dimensions of the policy’s impact. This is commonly done in a qualitative manner 
and is often based on subjective procedures. The present paper discusses a data-based, 
quantitative methodology to assess the relative performances of different climate policies, 
when long term economic, social and environmental impacts of the policy are considered. The 
methodology computes competitive advantages as well as relative efficiencies of climate 
policies and is here presented through an application to a sample of eleven global climate 
policies, considered as plausible for the near future. The proposed procedure is based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a technique commonly employed in evaluating the relative 
efficiency of a set of decision making units. We consider here two possible applications of 
DEA. In the first, DEA is applied coupled with Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in order to 
evaluate the comparative advantages of policies when accounting for social and 
environmental impacts, as well as net economic benefits. In the second, DEA is applied to 
compute a relative efficiency score, which accounts for environmental and social benefits and 
costs interpreted as outputs and inputs. Although the choice of the model used to simulate 
future economic and environmental implications of each policy (in the present paper we use 
the FEEM RICE model), as well as the choice of indicators for costs and benefits, represent 
both arbitrary decisions, the methodology presented is shown to represent a practical tool to 
be flexibly adopted by decision makers in the phase of policy design. 
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1.  Introduction 
Recent developments in climate change control have given an indication of how important it is to be 
accurate in measuring the efficiency of efforts towards climate control. In the past, the usual way of 
planning climate policy has led to a certain deadlock in negotiations. Indeed, even though the Kyoto 
Protocol came into force on February 16
th, its environmental effectiveness is very low due to the lack of 
participation of several key countries. In particular the world’s largest producer of GHG emissions, the 
US, has decided not only to remain outside the Kyoto framework, but has also announced a weak 
alternative climate change policy. The US decision has affected the participation incentives of various 
countries, as is for example shown by Australia’s postponement of the ratification and Russia’s hesitation 
to take a final position on the Kyoto Protocol. Only recently, in November 2004, did Russia finally 
ratified the treaty after a long period of contradictory announcements that had hindered the Kyoto 
Protocol’s coming into force. In addition, in order to implement an approach towards a successful long-
term strategy to halt the threat of climate change, developing countries also need to be included in the 
strategy.  
The US decision not to ratify Kyoto and its implications have thus clearly weakened the Kyoto Protocol 
and undermined its environmental effectiveness. At the same time, general consensus has emerged that 
the Kyoto Protocol represents only a first step towards the broader aim of minimising the danger of 
climate change. Climate change can only be effectively defeated if a large number of countries, including 
the major CO2-emitters, co-ordinate their efforts to reduce GHG emissions. In addition, the Protocol 
contains commitments only through 2012, thus implying that new negotiations on a Beyond-2012 phase 
will soon become necessary. Yet, given the difficulty of measuring climate policies in a satisfactory way, 
no strategy that can satisfy all the needs of all countries has yet been identified. This problem is becoming 
more pressing because of the increasing urgency to improve the credibility of climate policy in general. 
Indeed, in order to move forward in climate negotiations, countries need to have a better way of 
evaluating efforts at their disposal. Two particular reasons stress the importance of such an evaluation 
tool. First, the US needs to have instruments to evaluate its next steps in climate policy and not to lose 
face given its past strategy. Second, the general stalemate in the Kyoto negotiations suggests that all 
countries would benefit from a new approach to looking at climate change measures. Above all, focussing 
exclusively on emissions or emission concentrations or temperature appears to be too narrow
1. We need 
to move beyond this perspective in order to evaluate the efficiency of climate change control more 
comprehensively. In particular, given the international commitment towards sustainable development as 
                                                      
1 Indeed, an increase in recent research efforts emphasises the need to go beyond traditional CO2 concentration 
stabilisation exercises (see e.g., Sarofim et al., 2004; Kemfert at al., 2004; Richels et al., 2004; Tol, 2004).   2
the overall guideline for all areas of policy making
2, measurements of efficiency better able to account for 
the three dimensions of sustainability – i.e., the economic, social and environmental aspects – are 
essential if climate-energy policy is to be more effective and successful. 
 
Let us start by providing an overview of the debate related to the design of, and motivations behind, 
climate policies. During the last few decades, climate change has clearly evolved as one of the major 
threats to the earth’s sustainability. The political response in the form of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and more specifically the Kyoto Protocol have started a 
process towards a new climate architecture better able to cope with the complexities of climate change. 
However, given the difficulties of finding an agreement on international climate change efforts – in 
particular the current stalemate in including the major players in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol – 
and the continued spiralling increases in the global emission of greenhouse gases, the future of climate 
policy is still characterised by uncertainties. This has stimulated detailed discussions on potential climate 
policy scenarios and a number of different approaches have been applied in order to analyse the possible 
future of climate policy.  
On the one hand, research has generally tried to focus on searching for participation incentives in 
international environmental agreements. More specifically, the main research objective is to identify 
policy strategies and policy architectures (i.e. the design of an international climate agreement) that 
provide adequate incentives for the participation of most world countries in the cooperative effort to 
control GHG emissions. In this context, see, for example, Aldy, Barrett and Stavins (2003) for a survey of 
climate policy architectures; Buchner and Carraro (2003; 2004a,b) for a discussion of various 
participation incentives and Jacoby et al. (1999) for an identification of key architectural features. On the 
other hand, a large number of more focussed research studies have tried to explore what type of emission 
reduction commitments should be adopted by participating countries after the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, thus looking beyond 2012. In this strand of literature, see, for example, Baumert et al. 
(2002) for a collection of articles on possibilities for shaping an international climate change agreement, 
Berk et al. (2001) and den Elzen et al. (2003) for the analysis of different future climate regimes, Pershing 
and Tudela (2003) on ideas to establish more concrete long-term climate goals, or Torvanger et al. (2004) 
for a broad survey of current literature. In addition, there have been some recent attempts to link these 
two approaches, i.e. to highlight both the economic and environmental consequences of different 
scenarios on beyond Kyoto commitments and the implications of these commitments for providing 
                                                      
2 See, for example, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development that was adopted at the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 2 to 4 September 2002. This 
statement reaffirms the world’s commitment to sustainable development.    3
incentives for countries to participate (see e.g. Buchner and Carraro, 2005). The climate policy scenarios 
embedded in most of the policy proposals usually represent mitigation scenarios that are defined through 
a description and a quantified projection of how GHG emissions can be reduced with respect to some 
baseline scenario and/or how a specific GHG target can be achieved in order to stabilise atmospheric 
concentrations. They contain new emission profiles as well as costs and benefits associated with emission 
reductions. In order to do so, and once the first design phase is over, policies are simulated using 
economic-climate models in order to forecast the potential long-term effects on relevant variables, such as 
the implied increase in global atmospheric temperature or the effect on GDP growth. By means of such 
simulations, a comparison of different climate policies should be possible. 
Still, given the prevailing uncertainties, an accurate evaluation and thus comparison of climate 
policy proposals is difficult. Therefore, the objective of this paper is not solely to discuss and comment on 
different policies or policy portfolios, but is primarily to extract useful information in the phase where 
proposed and simulated climate policy scenarios are compared. For this purpose, we apply the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a methodology which is technically closely related to Multi-Criteria 
Analysis, in that it allows us to deal with situations where multiple inputs and outputs occur. In particular, 
we are interested in incorporating the economic, the environmental and the social dimensions of the 
positive and negative impacts of each policy scenario, in order to bridge the gap between the simulation 
phase, in which long-run effects of policies are mimicked, and the valuation phase, in which usually a 
coherent cost benefit analysis framework is adopted. These phases culminate with a useful set of 
information which provide feedback into the process of designing policies.  
DEA uses data observations to directly evaluate the relative performance of a set of decision 
making units, in a multi input–multi output context. At first, it was mainly developed to evaluate the 
relative efficiency of firms by transforming multiple inputs into multiple outputs, making minimal prior 
assumptions about the shape of the production possibility set, but inferring information from the data set. 
While the conventional definition of efficiency can be traced back to Farrell (1957), the first publication 
that made the DEA methodology popular and introduced it into the operation research world was Charnes 
et al. (1978). Subsequently, DEA has been applied to evaluate the relative performance of medical 
services, as in Nyman and Bricker (1989), or of educational institutions, as in Charnes et al. (1981). It has 
also been applied in the private sector, as in the valuation of banks, in Charnes et al. (1990). A thorough 
review of the theory and applications related to DEA can be found in Coelli et al. (1998), while an 
extensive bibliography is reported in the survey articles by Seiford (1996) and Taveres (2002). 
Applications to environmental and resource management problems are less frequent. In general, 
environmental and social impacts can be modelled as undesirable outputs or as conventional inputs. The 
absence of market prices for these undesirable outputs, which is a generally recognised valuation 
problem, can be overcome by employing DEA. Some studies have applied DEA in measuring ecological   4
efficiency (e.g. Dyckhoff and Allen, 2001); some others in measuring the environmental impact of 
different production technologies, as for example De Koeijer, et al. (2002), where the impact of different 
production techniques in the farm industry are compared. Bosetti and Locatelli (2003) consider the 
economic and environmental dimensions of management performances of National Parks, while 
Hernandez-Sancho  et al. (2000) consider the issue of efficiency in environmental regulation. An 
interesting overview of the role of DEA in environmental valuation can be found in Kortelainen and 
Kuosmanen (2004), while a survey of indicators of firms’ environmental behaviour can be found in 
Tyteca (1996). Ferrier and Hirschberg (1992) have applied DEA to the assessment of energy efficiency in 
buildings. 
However, to the authors’ knowledge, DEA has not yet been applied in the comparative 
assessment of (climate) policies. For this reason, the main objective of this paper is to use a fairly 
straightforward exercise to show an application of this technique in the valuation of different climate 
policies, in order to provide decision makers with an additional tool of analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodological framework 
describing, on one hand, the FEEM-RICE model which is adopted to simulate long-run effects of the 
different policies, and on the other hand, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology, which is 
then applied to compare the various policy scenarios. In particular, the choice of cost and benefit 
indicators for each policy is introduced and discussed. Section 3 provides a detailed overview of the 
policy scenarios that are the subject of this analysis. Both the features of the policy proposals and their 
underlying motivations are tackled. Finally, Section 4 discusses the results and provides conclusions as 
well as indications for further future research. 
2.  Methodology 
Our analysis is based on a hybrid methodology, which couples a traditional simulation analysis - 
performed in our case by means of a top-down optimal growth economic-climate model, the FEEM-RICE 
model - with a relative efficiency valuation technique, namely the DEA. We apply this methodology in 
order to compare a set of policy scenarios. These scenarios either stem from political feasibility 
considerations or from scientific concerns regarding unconstrained global warming, or from a 
combination of the two. The motivations for the policy scenarios in consideration are discussed in greater 
detail in the subsequent section. We shall now focus on the methodological issues. 
Let us start by considering the simulation phase. Scenarios are simulated using the FEEM-RICE 
model, a multi-region optimal growth model developed out of Nordhaus and Boyer’s RICE 99. The 
FEEM-RICE mainly differs from the original model in the treatment of endogenous technical change (for 
a detailed discussion see Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti 2004) and in the way the optimal solution is computed   5
(see Buonanno et al., 2000). Specifically, in FEEM-RICE each region plays a non-cooperative Nash 
game in a dynamic setting which yields an Open Loop Nash equilibrium. This is a situation where in each 
region central planners maximise their utility subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and 
the climate module for a given emission production of all the other players. Kyoto-type international 
environmental agreements can be easily accommodated by adding a constraint according to which 
regional emissions cannot exceed a given upper limit. It is also possible to account for international 
emission trading in the model simulation: in this case the standard identity between sources and uses of 
resources specifies that output be used for consumption and investment, to which proceeds or sales from 
net imports of permits should be added. In the case of permit trading, a region’s emissions may exceed 
the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of permit sales. Finally, in the 
FEEM-RICE model, the evolution of technology is endogenised. In particular, by including learning by 
doing and learning by researching, the two main driving forces of technological change are modelled. 
These two factors affect emissions in two ways: through the energy intensity relationship and through the 
carbon intensity relationship. Data on carbon emissions, which arise as output from the economic module, 
enter a three box climate module that produces data on temperature increase, which in turn feeds back 
into the economic module through a damage function. The presence of a climate module makes it 
straightforward to implement scenarios characterised by a long-term stabilisation target, as a cap on 
atmospheric carbon concentration or radiative forcing. 
The model simulates a set of climate policies which provide the ingredients for analysis in the 
subsequent comparison phase. Each simulated policy is evaluated through a multi-dimensional scoring 
vector, accounting for its economic, social and environmental performances. The choice of indicators 
may depend on what features one would like to emphasise and/or on what features are accounted for in 
the simulation model. As an example, the FEEM.-RICE model accounts for endogenous technology 
learning processes and an indicator of expenditure in R&D is available. In addition, the regional level of 
aggregation provides information on the distribution across the world of positive and negative impacts, 
obviously neglected in world aggregate models, while the issue of uneven distribution is recognised as 
one of the most problematic features of the climate change issue. Conversely, other models include a 
more detailed description of the different environmental impacts of climate change.
3  
Whatever the chosen vector of information, it is not always univocally possible to assess which is the 
most promising policy, unless one weakly dominates all the others (i.e. a policy is superior in at least one 
dimension without being inferior in any of the remaining dimensions). This depends on the fact that there 
does not exist a straightforward way of aggregating different impacts, which are typically expressed in 
                                                      
3 For example, information on sea-level increases can be included in the analysis. See Roson et al. (2004).   6
different units. The DEA approach overcomes the problem of incommensurability by solving a linear 
programming problem, whose decision variables are the aggregating weights. Note that DEA is extended 
from its traditional application, namely the evaluation of production firms’ performances, to evaluating 
the performance of policies. Thus, terms such as inputs and outputs, traditionally adopted in the DEA 
framework, have to be understood here in a broader sense as indicators of costs (or whatever indicators 
for which lower values are preferred) and indicators of benefits. In particular, we consider two possible 
approaches that differ mainly according to whether the emphasis is on assessing comparative advantages 
or a relative efficiency score. The first consists of linking the DEA to a CBA analysis. While the 
economic impact of each policy is expressed in terms of discounted net monetary value, social and 
environmental impacts are expressed in their own unitary measures. DEA is applied in order to obtain a 
comparative advantage measure for each policy, estimating weights, or prices for the non-monetary 
indicators that ought to be included in the valuation. The second approach is a more straightforward 
application of the traditional DEA, aiming at the computation of a relative efficiency measure for each 
policy. The efficiency measure is established mathematically by the ratio of the weighted sum of output to 
the weighted sum of input. In particular, a policy is 100 percent efficient if and only if: 
-  none of its output can be increased without either increasing one or more of its inputs, or 
decreasing some of its other outputs; 
-  none of its inputs can be decreased without either decreasing some of its outputs or increasing 
some of its other inputs. 
 
DEA-based Cost Benefit Analysis. 
Let us consider the first approach. Each scenario is identified through a set of economic indices. 
In our example, global discounted production and global discounted R&D expenditures are considered, 
both computed over the years 1995-2105 and expressed in trillions of 1990 USD. These two economic 
indices are aggregated in a discounted net economic value of each policy, NEm for the m-th policy 
scenario. Each scenario, m, is also characterised by a social impact indicator, Zs,m and an environmental 
impact indicator, Ze,m. Again, in our example, to account for a social perspective, each of the scenarios is 
valued for its impact on the welfare wedge between regions of the world, measured using an equity index. 
The computation of the equity index follows the approach proposed by Bosello and Roson (1999) and is 
built on the comparison of an “equity distributed level of consumption” with the actual average 
consumption per capita. Finally, in order to account for the environmental impact of each policy, several 
alternative measures could be adopted. For example, carbon or GHGs emissions, carbon or GHGs 
atmospheric concentrations, increase in radiative forcing or in temperature or total damage, which may be 
expressed in physical or monetary terms. Each measure represents a different stage of the climate cycle. 
In the present analysis, the increase in global temperature is chosen as the indicator for environmental   7
impact. The reason for this choice is that it coincides conveniently with the climate policy target 
(compared to, for instance, carbon atmospheric concentrations) and at the same time does not interfere 
with the still unresolved debate concerning impact on climate and its evaluation. The environmental 
impact index is expressed in temperature increases above pre-industrial levels in deg C. 
 
The set of indicators used in the first analysis is summarised in Table 2 and values for each indicator are 
depicted in Figures 1-4. 
The total benefit, TBm of policy m can be expressed as the difference between net discounted 
economic value and environmental and social impacts, more formally: 
(1)  m s s m e e m m Z p Z p NE TB , , − − =  
where pe and ps are the weights (prices) associated to the environmental and social indices. ,As discussed 
in Kortelainen and Kuosmanen (2004), we can consider the problem from a game-theoretic perspective 
and suppose that each defendant of a particular policy can adopt a strategic opportunistic behaviour and 
consider
4 the price vector, p, which maximises the advantages of the proposed policy, over the others. In 
practice, this consists of solving, for each policy m, the problem of choosing a non negative price vector 
that maximises that policy’s Comparative Advantage (CAm), given the other policies. More formally, it 
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4 On the basis of results of valuation studies, opportunely and opportunistically manipulated.   8
When the m-th policy turns out not to have any comparative advantage over the others, CAm < 0, even 
allowing for the choice of the most convenient prices vector, then it is clear that the policy should be 
rejected. Contrariwise, for policies showing a non-negative comparative advantage over other policies 
0 ≥ m CA , a sensitivity analysis on prices can be performed in order to have a better understanding of the 
results. The process can be enhanced by interfacing the discussion concerning the domain of weights to 
the political debate, thus enabling policy makers to gain a better understanding of how to interpret 
analysis results. 
 
DEA relative efficiency computation. 
The second approach involves the computation of efficiency scores based on the comparison of each 
policy with the others in the sample. A maximum score of unity (or 100%) is considered as the 
benchmark. Indicators are now reinterpreted in terms of inputs (costs) and outputs (benefits). On the input 
side, economic, environmental and social costs can be considered. In our example, we consider global 
discounted R&D expenditures as an economic cost indicator, computed over years 1995-2105 and 
expressed in trillions of 1990 USD. Global atmospheric temperature increases serve as an environmental 
impact indicator. Instead, on the output side, we consider global discounted output and global welfare 
(defined as the present value of per capita consumption) to be benefits, both computed over years 1995-
2105 and expressed in trillion of 1990 USD. Social benefits are accounted for through the equity index 
(computed as above). The set of indicators used in the second analysis is summarised in Table 3, and is 
identical to that used in the previous exercise but for one indicator, whose values are depicted in Figure 5. 
The efficiency score of each policy is expressed as the ratio of the weighted sum of outputs over the 
weighted sum of inputs. For each policy, a set of weights is chosen such that it maximises its efficiency. 
More formally, given the set of M policies, each with J outputs (benefits) given a set of I inputs (costs), 
let us denote by yjm and xim the vectors representing the quantities of outputs and inputs relative to the m-




























                  ,
1
1  
where uj and vi are two vectors of weights used in the measurement of policy m’s relative importance of 


































      
To simplify computations it is possible to scale the input prices so that the cost of the DMU m’s inputs is 
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In addition to the linearisation constraint, weights must be fixed at strictly positive values (greater than or 
equal to a very small quantity epsilon) so that no inputs or outputs are ignored in the process of 
determining the efficiency of each policy. 
If the solution to the maximisation problem gives a value of efficiency equal to 100, the corresponding 
scenario is considered to be efficient or non-dominated; if instead the efficiency value is inferior to 100, 
then the corresponding scenario is said to be dominated, and therefore does not lie on the efficiency 
frontier, which is defined by the envelopment of efficient scenarios. Furthermore, information concerning 
potential improvements of inefficient policies can be obtained. 
 
3.  Eleven Climate Policy Scenarios 
Based on the above methodological framework, a number of policy scenarios can be evaluated. This 
section will introduce the policy scenarios that have been chosen for our analysis, and the relevant policy   10
framework will be described. In total, we have designed ten scenarios on the basis of indications from 
policy processes and the scientific community. The resulting scenarios are particularly relevant for 
potential considerations of future climate policy. In addition to these policy scenarios, we provide as a 
first scenario a business-as-usual projection in order to have a credible benchmark for our evaluation. 
The BAU scenario is characterised by a continuation of the current trends in the main economic and 
environmental parameters.  
The remaining ten policy scenarios possess some common features. In particular, all scenarios assume 
that the absolute emission reductions defined in the Kyoto Protocol will be achieved by the Annex B–US 
countries
5 by 2010 (first commitment period). Indeed, it was Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
on November 4
6, 2004 that opened the way for the Protocol’s coming into force on February 16, 2005.
7 
The Protocol makes the emissions targets taken on for the 2008-2012 period by more than 30 developed 
countries (including the EU, Russia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland) legally 
binding. The US is assumed to achieve its –18% emission intensity target in order to slow the growth of 
GHG emissions per unit of economic activity over the next 10 years
8. Developing countries have no 
target in the first commitment period. 
Then, different assumptions characterise the different scenarios from 2020 onwards. Let us now briefly 
explain all the scenarios. Note that scenarios 2 to 7, chosen to cover both optimistic and pessimistic 
predictions on future abatement targets, have already been discussed in greater detail in Buchner and 
Carraro (2005). In particular, using the integrated climate-economy model FEEM-RICE, the six different 
scenarios on future emission abatement commitments have been analysed to provide an assessment of 
their implications for the economy. However, given the different scope of this paper, we will briefly recall 
their main features in order to enable a comprehensive background to our analysis. 
                                                      
5 We denote by Annex B–US the countries listed in the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol without the participation of 
the United States. 
6 After ratification by the Russian government and the Parliament, on November 4
th, President Putin signed a bill 
confirming Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, removing thus the last barrier for its entry into force as the 
ratification papers could be sent to the United Nations Reported by Associate Press, see 
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/R/RUSSIA_KYOTO_PROTOCOL?SITE=WAOLY&SECTION=HOME&TE
MPLATE=DEFAULT 
7 The Kyoto Protocol imposes absolute reduction targets, i.e. a reduction of absolute GHG emissions by a specified 
percentage. 
8 In order to replicate the US strategy as precisely as possible, our model computes the –18% intensity reduction by 
2010 compared to the year 2000. Climate policy in terms of emission intensity targets is typically expressed as 
percentage reductions from some base year level. In the US context, greenhouse gas intensity is given by the ratio of 
greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. For a detailed discussion of the US proposal, see for example De 
Moor et al. (2002), Goulder (2002), Viguier (2002).   11
The second scenario assumes a continuation of the current situation. After the US announced its 
defection from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, the remaining Kyoto countries – in particular the EU 
and Japan – put great effort into the continuation of the Kyoto process, in particular by convincing Russia 
to participate in the Protocol. This scenario assumes that the targets embedded in the Kyoto Protocol can 
be reached at the end of the first commitment period, as a consequence of Russia’s ratification and the 
subsequent entry into force of the treaty. Then, the Annex B–US countries decide to maintain their initial 
Kyoto targets and thus the corresponding emission level until the year 2100, whereas the US remains out 
of the Kyoto Protocol and implements no effective climate policy. This scenario thus represents the 
situation in which the Annex B–US countries behave according to the “Kyoto forever” hypothesis, whereas 
the US and the developing countries have no binding emission constraints. It is assumed all countries 
adopt cost-effective environmental policies, and in particular, emissions trading takes place among the 
Annex B–US countries.  
In the third scenario we assume that, given international and domestic political pressures, the US 
decides to join the group of countries committed to the Kyoto Protocol in the second commitment period 
and afterwards. Continuity with Kyoto could be attractive for the countries that are already engaged in the 
Kyoto Protocol, i.e. the Annex B–US, since these countries have already made a substantial investment in 
the Kyoto process (Bodansky, 2003). Developing countries, as in “Kyoto forever”, are assumed not to 
adopt any emission target until 2050. Consequently, emissions in Annex B countries will be stabilised at 
about –5% w.r.t their 1990 value, whereas emissions in developing countries will keep growing. 
Common assumptions characterise the second commitment period (2010-2020) of scenarios 4-7.
 
International and domestic pressures for climate change control are expected to induce countries to 
further strengthen their efforts in international climate policy. In particular, both the remaining Annex B 
countries and the US are assumed to agree by 2020 to reduce emissions by an additional 10% compared 
to the level of emissions achieved in 2010.
9 The –10% objective for developed countries was indicated as 
the most likely one for the second commitment period by a panel of 44 experts interviewed by Böhringer 
and Löschel (2003).
 In order to account for the need for developing countries to continue their economic 
and social development, and to catch up with the industrialised world, developing countries are still 
exempt from complying with emission reduction targets. This assumption is also in line with recent 
                                                      
9 When evaluating the economic implications of likely scenarios for the second commitment period, Böhringer and 
Löschel (2003) find that the global adjustment costs to accomplish the Post-Kyoto target of a 10% reduction in 
world carbon emissions (in their case with respect to the business-as-usual emissions in 2020) are likely to be 
moderate due to comprehensive “where-flexibility”. Frankel (2002) also advocates small additional emission cuts 
for the Annex B group in the second budget period in order to go towards the broader, long-term target of 
worldwide average of  conversion to a common formula for per-capita emissions.   12
research studies which conclude that it is unlikely developing countries will be included in international 
climate change control agreements before 2020
10.  
In the fourth scenario, therefore, the Annex B–US countries achieve the Kyoto target in the first 
commitment period and the –10% target (w.r.t. 2010 emissions) in the second one. The US adopts its –
18% intensity target in the first commitment period and the –10% absolute target (w.r.t. 2010 emissions) 
in the second one. Developing countries do not commit to any emission reductions. After 2020, we 
assume that cooperation on climate change control collapses and emissions return to their business-as-
usual (BAU) paths. 
The fifth scenario is based on the idea that Kyoto targets are largely sub-optimal – i.e. the 
incentives to reduce carbon emissions should be great enough to reach more ambitious targets – and that 
countries are only likely to adopt targets closer to the optimal ones in the medium term. The two initial 
commitment periods stay the same as in scenario 4. Then, after 2020, Annex B countries (including the 
US) and developing countries adopt what we call “enhanced permanent cooperation emission targets”,  
computed as follows. All countries cooperatively maximise their joint welfare with respect to their policy 
variables, including GHG emissions. This yields the optimal path of GHG emissions in all world regions, 
as it represents the cooperative outcome to all nations. Then, on the basis of the precautionary principle 
and given the relatively low emissions reduction in their optimal strategy, all countries pledge to reduce 
their emissions by an additional 10% below the optimal emission trajectories from 2020 onward.  
The  sixth scenario starts from the same premise as the previous one, namely that serious 
emission reductions are essential. Indeed, starting from 2020, the so-called Kyoto countries – Japan, 
European Union and Russia – are supposed, by 2050, to have achieved a total reduction in GHG 
emissions of –70% with respect to their 1990 emissions. This target is based on the recommendations of 
several politicians regarding the dangers of climate change. For example, the English Prime Minister 
Tony Blair has proposed to aim at a 60% cut in carbon emissions by 2050, thus implementing an 
emission reduction target of –10% for each decade, and he has advocated this target for all industrialised 
countries.
 11 A few days after Blair’s statement, the French President Chirac also echoed Blair’s proposal 
and insisted on a strong commitment to reduce GHG emissions. In a recent announcement, the European 
Council re-affirmed this intention, although the ambitious goal has not yet been supported by an agreed 
                                                      
10 For example, expert judgements presented in Böhringer and Löschel (2003) reveal that in the second commitment 
period up to 2020 “…in 75% of the policy-relevant scenarios, developing countries do not commit themselves to 
binding targets.” (p. 9) 
11 The “Speech on Climate Change” given by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on February 24
th, 2003, is 
available at http://www.britain-info.org/. The reduction goal is based on the outcomes of a recent report by The 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (2000) which found that a 60% reduction by 2050 was essential if 
the overall goal of stabilising GHG emissions at 550 ppmv was to be achieved already by 2050.   13
statement
12. The other countries – the US and the developing regions – reduce their emissions between 
2020 and 2050 by –15% for each decade. These targets thus imply strong emission reductions in both the 
US and the developing countries. From 2050 onwards, when countries have achieved the ambitious 
emission levels, all nations are committed to maintaining these emission levels. 
Scenarios 7, 8 and 9 are based on the common view that a stabilisation level of 550 ppmv in 2100 
represents a reasonable goal, also adopted in the emission mitigation scenarios examined by the latest 
IPCC report (IPCC, 2001)
13. In particular, the analysis of Working Group III in the TAR suggests that 
achieving the aggregate Kyoto commitments in the first commitment period can be consistent with 
trajectories that achieve stabilisation at 550 ppmv by the end of the century (WGIII TAR, Section 2.5.2). 
This concentration level also coincides with a doubling of CO2 atmospheric concentrations compared to 
pre-industrial levels. Stabilisation at such a level would imply a global warming of up to 3°C with a 
change in the mean surface temperature in the range of 1.6°C - 2.9°C by 2100
14. This long-term goal is 
imposed from the second commitment period onwards, from 2020 to 2100, and is to be achieved through 
various means of burden-sharing. 
In the seventh scenario we assume that all countries agree to make substantial efforts to control 
GHG emissions and to stabilise global GHG emissions at 550 ppmv in the year 2100
15. As indicated, this 
concentration goal is often used as a baseline hypothesis for models examining climate sensitivity. We 
assume linear convergence to 550 ppmv in 2100, starting in 2020. Again, the two initial commitment 
periods are designed as in Scenario 4. From 2020 onwards, targets are calculated to achieve the 550 ppmv 
stabilisation goal. This global target is allocated among the different world regions according to the 
“sovereignty” equity rule, as suggested by 44 experts (Cf. Böhringer and Löschel, 2003). This rule 
requires that the emission entitlements are shared in proportion to emissions and thus reflects the so-
called “polluter-pays principle”, indicating that individual countries are responsible for their own 
contribution to global warming. Therefore, the emission targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050 for all world 
                                                      
12 The 25 ministers agreed on March 23 2005 that developed nations should pursue cuts of heat-trapping gases of 
15-30 percent by 2020 and 60-80 percent by 2050 compared with levels set in the Kyoto Protocol, which uses 1990 
as a base in most cases. But the longer-term 2050 goal has been omitted from an agreed statement. See 
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2005-03-
23T173026Z_01_CHA362845_RTRUKOC_0_ENVIRONMENT-EU-CLIMATE.xml  
13 The target of not exceeding the 550 ppmv concentration level is also supported by the EU. The first significant 
EU proposal for a climate target for the post-2000 period, presented at the EU Council of Ministers in 1996, 
suggested stabilising the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at a level around twice the pre-industrial level of about 
280 ppmv, corresponding thus to the concentration target of 550 ppmv. 
14 In this range, although the strongest effects of climate change can be prevented, potentially serious damage 
attributable to climatic changes could still occur.  
15 Parts per million by volume is a measure of concentration of gases in the atmosphere.   14
regions, including developing countries, are based on both the 550 ppmv stabilisation goal and the 
sovereignty rule. 
The eighth scenario is based on the so-called Brazilian Proposal, made for the first time by 
Brazil during the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol. The idea is to allocate the emissions reductions of 
the industrialised, Annex I Parties in relation to the relative effect of a country’s historical emissions on 
global temperature increase (UNFCCC, 1997). We use this approach as suggested by RIVM (Cf. den 
Elzen et al., 1999), i.e. the Brazilian Proposal is applied on a global level, combined with a threshold for 
participation for the non-Annex I regions. In particular, the stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations at 
550 ppm in 2100 is achieved through burden sharing based on the contribution to temperature increase, 
combined with an income threshold for participation of the non-Annex I regions. This participation 
threshold is chosen as a percentage of the 1990 PPP Annex I per capita income. 
The ninth scenario applies an allocation concept proposed by the Global Commons Institute, the 
so-called Contraction & Convergence approach (Meyer, 2000), to stabilise atmospheric concentrations at 
550 ppm in 2100. This burden-sharing rule is also known as the Per Capita Convergence (PCC) approach 
and defines emission permits on the basis of a convergence of per capita emissions under a contracting 
global GHG emission profile. In such a convergence regime, all countries participate in the climate 
regime with emission allowances converging to equal per capita levels over time. 
The last two scenarios take into account the immense dangers embedded in a potential climate change. 
They are thus derived from the scientific perspective of climatologists who claim that strong emission 
reductions are required in order to halt the threat of global warming. 
In particular, the tenth scenario is based on the aim to stabilise CO2 concentrations at 450 ppmv 
by 2100. This emission reduction target is in general considered to be quite stringent, because it limits 
global mean warming to less than 3°C (see e.g. the analysis by the Working Group III in IPCC, 2001). 
Indeed, such a stabilisation is supposed to significantly reduce or even avoid many of the impacts listed 
for 3°C warming or more, enabling thus much higher benefits than a stabilisation at lower levels.
16 We 
assume linear convergence to 450 ppmv in 2100, starting in 2020. 
The final scenario, number 11, follows recent claims that the attention on the stabilisation of 
atmospheric GHG concentrations is not enough to solve the dilemma of climate change. Instead, one 
needs to go beyond the focus on concentrations by setting specific climate or radiative forcing targets (cf. 
Sarofim et al, 2004; Kemfert et al, 2004; Tol, 2004). According to the IPCC (2001), radiative forcing is 
the change in the balance between radiation coming into the atmosphere and radiation going out. The 
term “radiative forcing” has been employed to denote an externally imposed perturbation in the radiative 
                                                      
16 Note, however, that there would still be risks for impacts associated with mean warming of less than 3°C.   15
energy budget of the Earth’s climate system. On average, a positive radiative forcing tends to warm the 
surface of the Earth while a negative forcing tends to cool the surface
17. Changes in the radiation budget 
can thus lead to changes in climate parameters, resulting thereby in a new equilibrium state of the climate 
system. The policy scenario that we adopt in this context is to stabilise radiative forcing at 4.5 Wm
–2 
relative to pre-industrial times by 2100
18. This target is quite ambitious, and corresponds roughly to an 
equilibrium temperature of 3°C by 2100, inducing substantial emission reductions.  
Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary of the main features of the 11 scenarios.  
 
4.  Discussion of results and conclusions 
This paper has aimed to investigate DEA methodology as a tool for comparing and more 
comprehensively evaluating climate policies. Let us now discuss the main findings. 
The results of the DEA-based CBA are summarised in Table 4 and Table 5. First, we performed the 
analysis considering unconstrained domains for the two weights (prices) related to impact on the   
environment and on society. Starting from the assumption that either the environmental or the social 
impacts or even both of them could be ignored in the valuation, still seven out of the eleven scenarios in 
consideration cannot be put aside but have to go through further analysis (see Table 4). If we instead 
assume that each of the two non-economic impacts has to play some – even if a very small – role, then a 
constrained analysis has to be performed and the deriving results are summarised in Table 5. In particular, 
we see that only three out of the eleven scenarios have a non-negative value of comparative advantage, 
and they are the “Kyoto Forever without US”, the “Enhanced permanent global cooperation” and the 
“550ppmv through Contraction & Convergence” scenarios.  
Let us explore these findings in more detail. The first scenario, “Kyoto Forever without US”, is 
characterised by only a slight comparative advantage. Still, this result is striking as it indicates that the 
continuation of the current path in climate policy, i.e. moderate efforts by a subset of countries, can be 
                                                      
17 Potential perturbations can be induced by secular changes in the concentrations of radiatively active species (e.g., 
CO2, aerosols), changes in the incidence of solar irradiance upon the planet, or other changes that affect the radiative 
energy absorbed by the surface (e.g., changes in surface reflection properties). For a more detailed discussion see 
e.g. IPCC (2001). 
18 Recently, this stabilisation target has become a new focus and quite a common research topic. For example, one of 
the objectives of the EMF 21 Working Group is to conduct a new comprehensive, multi-gas policy assessment to 
improve the understanding of the effects of including non-CO2 GHGs and sinks into short- and long-term mitigation 
policies. In this context, a new long-term, CO2-only stabilisation scenario is investigated in order to evaluate the 
significance of multigas mitigation (including sinks). The relevant emissions target consists in the stabilisation of the 
radiative forcing at 4.5 Wm-2 relative to pre-industrial times by 2150, holding the radiative forcing from non-CO2 
GHGs constant at the 2100 level. See, for example, Tol (2004) and Kemfert et al. (2004).   16
considered as a strategy that enables a good economic performance, whilst maintaining comparatively 
acceptable environmental and social impacts. The second scenario, “Enhanced permanent global 
cooperation”, already has a quite significant comparative advantage. This result appears to be important 
for the future evolution of climate policy, as it implies that deriving future emission reductions from 
countries’ optimal abatement strategies, and imposing moderate targets on all countries, including the 
developing countries, can be advantageous from a sustainability point of view. This scenario is thus 
attractive both for the single countries and for the overall goal of sustainable development. The final 
scenario, “550ppmv through Contraction & Convergence”, provides a very large comparative advantage. 
This result can be considered as being striking, given that it again includes the participation of all 
countries with per capita emission allowances converging towards equal levels over time. The approach 
combines stabilisation at a reasonable level of atmospheric concentrations with a strategy that appears to 
be rational for all countries. While costly in terms of impact on global gross output, the scenario 
comparative advantage derives from its extremely beneficial environmental and social implications.  
Moreover, to further discriminate among policies, it can be extremely useful to analyse the DEA-based 
CBA results in the prices space. As an example, let us concentrate on the scenario “Kyoto Forever 
without US”. Figure 6 shows how comparative advantage of the considered scenario changes, given the 
entire range of prices of the environmental impact (pe) and of the social impact (ps), expressed in dollar 
per index number. Analogously, surfaces corresponding to each of the policy scenarios can be added to 
the graph, then, given the coordinates corresponding to an estimate or a subjective judgment of prices, 
representing different dimensions of sustainability, it will be possible to see which of the policies prevail. 
This type of analysis provides the decision maker with a more complete and general set of information, 
which can provide the stimulus and the quantitative basis for subsequent political and ethical debate. 
Results derived from the traditional DEA analysis are presented in Tables 6 and 7. A policy is 
rated as fully (100%) efficient on the basis of available evidence if and only if the performances of other 
policies do not show that some of its inputs or outputs can be improved without worsening some of its 
other inputs or outputs. Table 6 provides the results for a cost minimisation model with constant returns to 
scale. As it happens, efficiency measures appear to be similar, making it difficult to pinpoint the existing 
differences between policies. This is a numerical problem, partly due to the limited set of policies in the 
analysis. In order to overcome this problem and to better distinguish between policies, we introduce an 
artificial policy, which we refer to as the ‘optimal scenario’, which is a virtual policy composed taking, 
for any indicator, the best score in the sample. Results of this second analysis are presented in Table 7, 
where it is possible to better discriminate among scenarios. “BaU” and “550ppmv through Contraction & 
Convergence” scenarios appear to be the most efficient in this analysis (of course this is also true for 
‘perfect scenario’, by construction). The first result, i.e. the positive performance of the business-as-usual 
case, seems to be logical from a cost minimisation perspective. Indeed, as expected, no commitment to   17
climate change control leads to the best outcome in terms of avoided expenditures. The more striking 
finding regards again the “550ppmv through Contraction & Convergence” scenario. This policy 
architecture confirms the good performance obtained in terms of sustainability. As a consequence, this 
approach seems to be very promising for future negotiations on climate change control. At the same time, 
it is possible to get information concerning potential improvements for other scenarios that prove 
inefficient; these can be derived from the comparison of the inefficient policy with the nearest efficient 
policies, or peer group. Therefore, corrective measures can be designed in order to reshape partially 
flawed policy structures. 
Summarising, this paper has applied an innovative method based on the coupling of an integrated 
climate-economy model with the Data Envelopment Analysis methodology to evaluate a range of climate 
policy scenarios. The analysis has provided some information on the relative efficiency of different policy 
lines. In particular, it has been shown that the inclusion of all world countries in the international climate 
change efforts can be advisable both from a sustainability and a cost minimisation perspective. Indeed, 
the scenario that aims, by 2100, to stabilise CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm by including all world 
countries according to the so-called Contraction & Convergence approach, is characterised by positive 
performances with regard to the economic, environmental and social dimensions.  
However, the findings of this analysis need to be taken cautiously, because of the arbitrariness of 
the choice of the impacts indicators and of the choice of the simulation model. Nonetheless, the 
methodology in itself can represent an important tool for policy makers, through the identification of a 
number of policy strategies that appear to be crucial for the evolution of the future climate debate. As a 
consequence, the approach adopted in this paper could be extremely beneficial if combined with different 
types of climate-economy models and different choices of costs and benefits indicators.  
   18
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Table 1: An overview on the alternative policy architectures 
Expected Emissions 
  2010  2020  from 2020 onwards 





Scenario 2 “Kyoto Forever without US” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  2010 level  2010 level 
US  -18% intensity target  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Scenario 3 “Kyoto Forever without US only in the first commitment period” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  2010 level  2010 level 
US  -18% intensity target  Kyoto constraint  2020 level 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Scenario 4 “Annex B cooperation only until 2020” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  -10% 
US  -18% intensity target  -10% 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
“Business-as-Usual” 
Scenario 5 “Enhanced permanent global cooperation” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  -10% 
US  -18% intensity target  -10% 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
“Enhanced cooperation”
1 
Scenario 6 “-70% emission target” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  -10%  -70% emission target in 
US  -18% intensity target  -10% 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
 -15% each decade 
Scenario 7 “Stabilisation at 550 ppmv” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2%  -10% 
US  -18% intensity target  -10% 
Developing countries  business-as-usual  business-as-usual 
Stabilisation at 550 ppmv 




Scenario 8 “550ppmv through the RIVM’s Brazilian Proposal” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2% 
US  -18% intensity target 
Developing countries  business-as-usual 
Stabilisation at 550 ppmv in 2100 with emission 
reductions allocated according to 
the Brazilian Proposal combined with threshold for 
non-Annex I regions 
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Scenario 9 “550ppmv through Contraction & Convergence” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2% 
US  -18% intensity target 
Developing countries  business-as-usual 
Stabilisation at 550 ppmv in 2100 with emission 
reductions allocated according to 
C&C Approach: 
All Parties participate immediately in the climate 
regime with per capita emission allowances 
converging towards equal levels over time.  
Scenario 10 “ Stabilisation at 450 ppmv ” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2% 
US  -18% intensity target 
Developing countries  business-as-usual 
Stabilisation at 450 ppmv in 2100  
Scenario 11 “Radiative Forcing” 
Annex B-US  Kyoto target: -5.2% 
US  -18% intensity target 
Developing countries  business-as-usual 
Stabilisation of radiative forcing at 4.5 Wm–2 relative 
to pre-industrial times by 2100 
1 Targets deduced from the optimal cooperative intertemporal solution of the dynamic game among countries and 
strengthened by requiring an additional –10 % reduction. 
 
 
Table 2: An overview on the cost and benefit indicators 
Social Indicator   
Equity Index:  
AY
EY
EI =  
where EY stands for equivalent income, AY for average income and 









NetGDP n share pop EY log * ) ( _ exp  
Distance from maximum attained equity value 
Environmental Indicator   
Temperature   Measured in (deg C) above pre-industrial levels. Distance from a target 
of 2 deg C 
Economic Indicators   
Production  Global Discounted Output (1995-2105), measured over the eight macro 
regions, in 1990 USD. 
R&D expenditures  Global Discounted R&D Expenditures (1995-2105), measured over the 
eight macro regions, in 1990 USD 
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Table 3: An overview on the cost and benefit indicators 
Benefit Indicators 
Equity Index (in absolute value) 
Global Discounted Output (1995-2105) in 1990 USD 
Global Discounted Consumption (1995-2105) in 1990 USD 
Cost Indicators 
Global Discounted R&D Expenditures (1995-2105) in 1990 USD 




Table 4: Results of DEA-based CBA. No bounds on both 
prices 
  CA Pe  Ps 
Scenario 1  -0.01 0.00  0.00 
Scenario 2  0.12 7.30  0.00 
Scenario 3  -0.06 2.47  5.93 
Scenario 4  0.03 2.47  0.00 
Scenario 5  1.96 13.64  5.42 
Scenario 6  0.11 17.14  1.47 
Scenario 7  0.21 39.33  3.41 
Scenario 8  1.79 92.16  0.00 
Scenario 9  19.88 0.00  13.87 
Scenario 10  -0.16 35.62  3.08 
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Table 5: Results of DEA-based CBA. Lower and Upper Bounds 
on both Prices, Pe∈[5, 150]; Ps∈[5, 150]. 
  CA Pe  Ps 
Scenario 1  -0.13 5.00  5.00 
Scenario 2  0.07 5.00  5.00 
Scenario 3  -0.06 5.00  5.00 
Scenario 4  -0.07 5.00  5.00 
Scenario 5  1.96 13.64  5.42 
Scenario 6  -1.17 5.00  5.00 
Scenario 7  -0.92 27.25  5.00 
Scenario 8  -2.27 27.25  5.00 
Scenario 9  230.93 150.00  150.00 
Scenario 10  -1.80 27.25  5.00 




Table 6: Results of the Cost Minimising Constant 
Return to Scale Model 
Unit Score 
Scenario 8  100,00 
Scenario 9  100,00 
Scenario 2  100,00 
Scenario 4  100,00 
Scenario 5  100,00 
Scenario 1  100,00 
Scenario 3  99,26 
Scenario 6  94,87 
Scenario 10  94,60 
Scenario 7  93,23 
Scenario 11  92,47 
   25
 
 
Table 7: Results of the Cost Minimising Constant 
Return to Scale Model, with Perfect DMU 
Unit Score 
Scenario 9  100,00 
Scenario 1  100,00 
Perfect  100,00 
Scenario 4  99,69 
Scenario 2  98,60 
Scenario 3  97,79 
Scenario 5  89,79 
Scenario 7  86,54 
Scenario 8  83,52 
Scenario 11  81,33 
Scenario 10  79,76 
Scenario 6  78,43 
 
 
Figure 1: Economic indicator for different scenarios: Global Discounted Output (1995-2105) in 
1990 USD   26
Figure 2: Economic indicator for different scenarios: Global Discounted R&D Expenditures  
(1995-2105) (trillions 1990 USD) 
 
 
Figure 3: Environmental indicator for different scenarios: Global CO2 Atmospheric Temperature 
in 2105 in deg C above pre-industrial levels   27
Figure 4: Social indicator for different scenarios: Equity Index 
 
Figure 5: Economic indicator for different scenarios: Global Welfare (trillions 1990 USD) 
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Figure 6: Comparative Advantage of Scenario 2 in the price space (Pe, Ps) 
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